Is All Lost or A Lot Is Still Recoverable? A Case of 21st Century Indian Military Organizational Culture

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Abstract: The armed forces of a nation ought to be infallible organizations, scrupulous in action and deeds. They stand testimony to a nation's strength and solidarity. Non-military organizations strive hard to achieve military like austerity, discipline, work ethos and credos. Today, Indian Armed Forces in general and Indian Army in particular is an organization with troubled culture, much of which is attributable to its resistance to change and strong stereotypes. While the socio-economic and technological changes have swept the world, the Indian Armed Forces have not been to appreciate and accommodate the changes that have impacted the very fabric of the organization. The authors have attempted to study the organization culture at the Indian armed forces through the lens of Warrick's 2016 framework for high performance and low performance cultures. Adopting the mixed-method approach for data collection, the authors divided the study in two phases. In Phase I an in-depth systematic literature review was conducted and in phase II the authors conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews. The methodology was selected to be able to go into a lot of depth, and allow the participants to bring to fore the topics that the researchers had not even considered and to identify all empirical evidence to answer all the research question that were created using the Warrick's 2016 framework. Citing replete evidences, the authors propose that the armed forces present a case of stagnating culture. Is all lost or a lot is still recoverable? is the idea with which the authors explored the extant literature and garnered evidence from world class armies across the globe. Drawing from the experiences of world class armies, the authors present a well-researched way forward for the Indian armed forces. The study is original in its intent and execution and presents insightful recommendations for all levels of leaders in the Indian armed forces, policy makers, bureaucrats and diplomats.

Keywords: Armed Forces, Civil-Military Relations, High Performance & Low Performance Cultures, Military Leadership, Organizational Culture, Stress, Talent Retention.

INTRODUCTION

In the words of George S. Patton Jr "The soldier is the army. No army is better than its soldiers. The soldier is also a citizen. In fact, the highest obligation and privilege of citizenship is that of bearing arms for one's country." However, in the last few decades this privilege became a burden much too heavy for the men of the Indian Armed Forces. "The British left a legacy of a socially deep-rooted and well-settled military establishment, where the tri-services of the armed forces were based on the principle of commissioned officers as 'leaders' and the recruited or enlisted men as 'followers'." (Sofat 2016). The soldier of the Indian Army was mainly recruited from a rural background, with a limited educational experience, and capable of tackling insurmountable adversities, while officer was recruited from the elite social communities of urban India.

Indian Army culture was conceptualized when the values of simplicity, honesty, commitment, modesty, patience and empathy were the norm and imparted meaning to the service rendered by the men in uniform. Liberalization of the economy coupled with the advent of technology and social media, perpetuated consumerism, reshaped democracy and impacted the value fabric of the enlisted men in an unprecedented manner (Swami, 2016). The organizational milieu was fast changing, but the armed forces failed to keep pace with these changes. This is attributable to a gross indifference in acknowledging the impact of technological, socioeconomic changes.

The politico-bureaucratic establishments share an equal brunt in denigrating the status of the Indian Army with anomalous policies and inequity in pay and benefit (when compared to civil services). Urban migration, disintegration of the joint family system and overt exposure further enchanted the uniformed men towards a life of comfort by either making ethical transgressions or hanging up their boots. Indian Army was not a band of brothers anymore, unlike three decades ago when the century old culture of deference served as the glue in

successfully creating formidable natural deeply tied bonds. The negative had permeated into the sacrosanct hallways of the Indian Army (Ram, 2011).

Culture and Its Impact

Research as early as the 1980's shared that "organizational culture had a direct impact on performance, morale, job satisfaction, employee engagement and loyalty, employee attitudes and motivation, turnover, commitment to the organization, and efforts to attract and retain talented employees" (e.g., Denison, 1990; Fisher, 2000; Marcoulides & Heck, 1993; Rollins & Roberts, 1998; Weiner, 1988). A study by Kotter and Heskett (1992) inspired scholars to build a framework of performance cultures and identify the characteristics of high performance and low performance cultures (Kilmann, Saxton, & Serpa, 1985; Rosenthal & Masarech, 2003; Weiss, 2011; Daft, 2015; Lussier & Achua, 2016).

The proposed framework asserted that performance cultures were a product of effective leadership and management orientation (Mannion, Davies, & Marshall, 2005; Warrick, 2017). Leadership, majorly influential at the top (Warrick et al., 2016), was known to affect cultures through its strategies, practices, values, style, example setting (Steers & Shim, 2013) and bring about significant, positive changes and performance transformations (Brady, 2005; Tyrangiel, 2012; Hoffman, 2012).

Culture and The Armed Forces

Culture has impacted the military organizations across the globe. Unfortunately, the complexity and intangibility inherent in the concept of culture rendered it difficult to measure or quantify (Winslow & Schwerzel, 2004) and it thus remained conspicuous by its absence from the definitions of military power (Fowler, 2016). The scholarship was rather more focused on "other immediate factors such as leadership, policies, procedures, strategies and training in explaining the effectiveness of military performance over past few decades" (Murray, 1999). Recent scholarly works describe military culture as "a unique combination of values, attitudes, beliefs, with shared institutional ethos that influences the expectations regarding behavior in areas such as discipline, teamwork, loyalty, and selfless duty for those in the armed forces" Dorn & Ulmer (2000) recognized culture as the 'foundation of military effectiveness" They highlighted its positive impact on enhancing the performance during combat as well peace support operations (Dandekar & Winslow, 1999; Greene, Buckman et al., 2010).

Research Approach

The authors have attempted to study the organization culture at the Indian Armed Forces through the lens of Warrick's 2016 framework for high performance and low performance cultures. The researchers adopted a mixed method approach for data collection. The study was divided in two phases.

Phase I

In the first phase the researchers conducted an in-depth systematic literature review to identify all empirical evidence to answer the research questions that were created using the Warrick's 2016 framework. By using explicit and systematic methods of reviewing articles and all available evidence, bias was minimized, thus providing reliable findings from which conclusions can be drawn and decisions made (Moher et al., 2009). "Systematic reviews have foremost been developed within medical science as a way to synthesize research findings in a systematic, transparent, and reproducible way and have been referred to as the gold standard among reviews" (Davis et al., 2014). To collect the studies focused on the organizational culture of the Indian Armed Forces based on the criteria of Warrick's 2016 framework for high performance and low performance cultures and the inclusion criteria for selection of articles were as follows:

All the articles post the Operation Vijay (1999) between the year 2000 till 2019 were selected for this review. All the articles authored on the theme by either a retired Indian Armed Forces' officer, from a recognized defence expert (invited to share their opinion on various matters of national defence) and defence columnists in popular dailies, magazines and MoD Reports were considered. An in-depth search on using research platforms such as EBSCO research data base platform, and specifically Indian Defence Journals and Magazines such as Journal of Defence Studies, USI Journal - The United Service Institution of India, FORCE Defence Magazine was undertaken with the use of the following keywords "organizational culture and Indian Armed Forces, high performance culture, low performance culture, organizational culture, armed forces, attrition in Indian Armed Forces, performance appraisal and Indian Armed Forces, performance culture and Indian Armed Forces, corruption and Indian Armed Forces, armed forces as a career option for the youth of India, satisfaction level of officers of Indian Armed Forces, occupational stress in the armed forces where articles based on the topic were published.

Phase II

In the second phase the authors conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with 10 retired Indian Military officers. The methodology was chosen as there were very few recognized qualitative studies on the issues and challenges with the organizational culture of the Indian Armed Forces. Using of qualitative methodology also allowed the interviewees to open up, feel comfortable and flexibility in sharing their ideas on the topics. To be able to go into a lot of depth on the questions, they had much to share and bring to fore the topics that the researchers had not even considered.

For this part of the study semi-structured interviews were conducted with 10 retired Indian Military officers from across different ranks and different arms of the Indian Army. Two of the officers had served as Lt. Generals, and Major Generals that represented the top echelons of the military leadership. The middle level leadership was sufficiently represented by four officers who had recently retired as Colonels and Lt. Colonels. And the junior leadership was well represented by four officers who had retired as Majors from different arms of the Indian Army. Due to the on-going crisis (Covid-19), and also as none of the interviewees were located in the native city of the authors, all interviews were conducted with VC.

The first criterion of selecting the participants was that they were not previously known to any of the authors, so as to rule out any possibilities of any conflict of interests. Also, to avoid any biases in the process of interviewing and remove any and all apprehensions that are observed while being interviewed by a known acquaintance. The second and equally important criterion for selecting of the participants was that they represent all the three leadership levels of the Indian Army Officer Cadre. The second criterion was that they represent the combat as well as the non-combat arms of the Indian Army. The third criterion for the officers representing the junior leadership level was that all the officer participants have had a minimum of 5 years of experience serving in a non-combat or combat arm of the Indian Army. The authors began the process of interviewing the participants and completed the process within a period of a month. The guiding principle for undertaking the number of interviewees was based on the theoretical principle of saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), that is, the point at which the information collected begins to repeat itself (Hennink, Hutter, & Bailey, 2011).

Stagnation In Military Culture

Over the last six decades, while the Indian military leadership was deeply engrossed in maintaining their status quo, finding post retirement employment and basking in false regimental spirits and loyalties (Singh, 2016), the issue of the stagnating military culture had gone largely unattended. The oversight and inability to nurture and evolve their culture did not only impact the performance and effectiveness of its foot soldier, but also the process of military innovation (Murray, 1999). While media, experts, veterans and the scholarship at large saw this as an act of gross negligence, the military leadership saw this as an act of protecting their culture from being corrupted by the very forces shaping the national culture. The leadership believed that their core values were non-negotiable in the wake of any societal change taking place or may take place in the times to come.

Signs Of Reduced Performance

Cultures are not monolithic or simple, there are underlying dualities and consequences. Watts & Murray (1996) observed that "some of their consequences are practical, others are expressive; some are obvious, others are hidden; some are positive for the cultural entity; others are negative." The first manifestations of the negatives were displayed in the form of poor behaviour at the top with the involvement of top brass in petty matters such as redressal of the age controversy, placing of a discipline and vigilance ban on an officer for approving of staged killings of innocent civilians. Moving the court against top brass of various departments, on charges of using their official position, and power to wrongly frame an officer (Gokhale, 2012). Verbal clashes characterized by incivility in discourse, crossing the red lines on social media platforms, were transpiring on every popular social media platform and a recent incident dated June 22, 2020, wherein, Indian Army veterans from the top brass and the junior leadership were engaged in one such interaction and bringing shame to their organization.

Display of ineffectual leadership with a lack of vision, mission, goals, role clarity and strategies being unclear, not compelling, and not used were seen during various military operations over the years. The Indian Armed Forces have often put up a poor show in terms of jointmanship and it became more obvious than ever in the Kargil crisis of 1999. These conflicts exposed flaws in the Indian Armed Forces (Acosta 2007). Each service acted as a disparate entity blinded by parochial interests, fought an almost solo battle lacking absolute holisticity (Singh, 2009), worked in silos and remained stuck with the so called white, green and blue mind-set (Prakash, 2006). This engendered adequate political consensus to commit to the much-needed restructuring of the higher defence organization and raising of joint structures. Based on a high-profile Ministerial Report, a Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) was established in 2001 to provide an integrated, tri-service, military advice to the government. But still, not much has been achieved as the inherent disconnect does not allow them to take an integrated stand on key policy issues that affect the defence forces (Joshi, 2006).

Security and defense share a twilight zone and cannot be compartmentalized, more so since 9-11 which marked the beginning of the Multipolar World. In India, the army is often deployed for reasons beyond insurgency and war. Army personnel have been deployed in the past for disasters and most recently for the Covid-19 pandemic. Now the question arises that have they really been trained for this?

Studies highlighted that employees working for organizations having a high-pressure, negative, tense, stressful, and/or resistant work environment were 50% more prone to health challenges and that "disengaged employees had high absenteeism and more accidents" (Seppälä & Cameron, 2017). Over the years, Indian Army witnessed rising cases of suicides, fratricides, fragging, accidental deaths, incidents of insubordination, indiscipline, low morale and disengagement. Data from Indian Army Regional Trauma Centres, reports from the MoD and media, all reinforce that during 1999 to 2014 the Indian Army lost a minimum of 1600 men in non-operational causalities every year. Around 1383 soldiers lost their lives to suicides, fratricides and fragging during 2000-2019. On per thousand troops deployed, the accidental deaths accounted for 23%, and environmental deaths 8.7% of the total casualties. The single biggest cause of accidental death was road traffic accidents, followed by accidental discharge of weapons and accidental fall and falling objects (Arora, Bhatia & Rana, 2008).

Post the Kargil war, a sudden surge in the militant activities in J&K once again drew a weary soldier back in the conflict zone. Since then, he has been constantly deployed in the areas of intense conflict, leaving him with no time to recover and recoup. Life in peace postings were essentially the much-needed time to recover and focus on training. But, being back to the peace areas, life became even more entangled in tasks of organizing events, parties, get together that created stress and overburdened an already drained soldier (Mishra, 2020). Apart from that, the jawans in peace and conflict areas complained of being employed in unsoldierly tasks, poor living accommodation and sanitary facilities, subpar clothing and rations, denial of basic leave and adequate leave and lack of professional help (counsellors and psychiatrists) which left the men feeling disgruntled, demotivated and abated chronic stress and suicides among jawans (Satam, 2017). The majority of PBORs facing disciplinary proceedings today was for being AWL (Away Without Leave) and OSL (Overstay Leave) showing signs of disengagement and a clear lack of commitment.

Followed by communication gap between the officer and the jawan, public punishment, abusive behavior by officers, feudal paternal hierarchy, injustice (both perceived and actual), and poor grievance redressal mechanisms, the exploitation of the buddy/sahayak system was substantiated when on March 3, 2017 a video showing jawans taking the senior officers' pets out for a walk, to taking their children to schools, and even to the extent of taking their wives on shopping sprees went viral (Banerjee, 2017) for which the Indian Army faced a lot of backlash. And yet, the army admonished the incident calling it a rare occurrence, and lastly the changing recruitment pattern. The distinction of jawans belonging to the rural and officer from an urban set up was thing of the past. At times the officer and jawan belonged to the same village, and at times the jawan belonged to a more affluent background than the unit officer. This led to both the men and officer have close to similar aspirations and expectations. This change further narrowed down the leader-follower gap making taking orders difficult for the jawan and attributed for the frequent cases of insubordination and indiscipline being recorded in various units.

Indian Army's cover up culture and practice of guarded communication, characterized by reluctance to be open and straightforward was visible when maximum of indisciplinary issues were quashed on the spot, but the media caught wind of few of the major ones where fierce verbal clash was coupled with physical assault on the officers. One such instance occurred in May 2012, a soldier was brutally beaten up by a group of officers and resultantly the jawans retaliated with and staged protests against the officers causing casualties (Swami, 2016). On October 10, 2013, in another altercation the men beat up an officer over a soldier being castigated for losing a boxing match. Yet again a soldier assaulted the commanding officer, a supposed leader, for denial of leave and taking disciplinary action against PBOR (Ramachandran, 2013).

Corruption and questionable ethics, Dean Ludwig and Clinton Longnecker (1993) in a seminal paper propose that ethical transgressions are a by-product of success/positional power. Positional power legitimizes access to information and organizational resources, and this makes powerful beings more vulnerable to unethical behaviors. Thus, situational forces predominate, and takeover individual's moral make up in ethically challenging contexts (Haidt, 2001). Over the years the Indian Army could not keep itself immune from the world of scams and scandals.

A Military Secretary accused of taking bribe, a colonel reportedly arrested for a highway robbery in Mizoram, a former Air Chief charged for accepting bribe in the VVIP Helicopter deal, an NDA commandant, two colonels and others were charged for alleged corruption and cheating in the recruitment process of the training establishment, (2012), a serving Brigadier. was arrested in the Canteen Stores Department Bombay scam involving many others. Next, the trend of acceptance of staged killings of innocents for the purpose of commendations and promotion by the middle and junior leadership was overlooked by the leaders. The 2010 Macchil encounter, fake killings at Siachen Glacier, Jammu & Kashmir, Northeast and the Naxal belt were reported. The tag of ketchup colonel was once such story where the leadership made officers of the rank of a Colonel and Major to stage killings for the purpose of their professional benefit in the Northeast sector.

Assam Rifle which had officers on deputation from the Indian Army became a sea of corruption, a brigade commander was found accepting bribe for writing ACR of the COs in the North East, (Singh, 2016), and a DG, the ADG and the Chief Engineer of the force were apprehended receiving bribes for the contracts through a Junior Commissioned Officer (Mathur, 2015). Further, a Lt Gen (Retd.) was accused of misusing INR 0.1 in million government funds for personal use (International, 2019). Until 2013 a total of 20 officers and 200 soldiers had faced administrative actions such as disciplinary proceedings and court martials for involvement in these incidents and these are just the official figures (Kaul, 2013).

Signs of disengagement and lack of commitment in the officers were also visible when the leadership failed to protect them for doing their duty in sheer good faith. In the year 2012, a petition was filed by Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEFAMA) of Manipur to take an objective decision on innocent killings by the officers of the Indian Army. The incident not only made the judiciary foray into the hitherto coveted space of the forces, it also reverberated the idea that their leaders cannot protect them from allegations. This could be construed as the weakness of the top brass, leading to a big blow to the morale of junior leadership and men alike (Menon, 2018).

Exposure to a dazzling civil world through social media, adversely impacted the civil-military relations. They could compare their regimented lives with the flamboyance of the civil world and thus felt a sense of inequity. The rising power of bureaucracy coupled with mismanagement within their organization and the insensitive attitude of the people outside resulted in men losing objective. Due to the close allegiance of Service Chiefs' with political groups, the soldier saw fighting these wars as a lost cause and questioned why should he be the one losing his life in the end?

Lack of diversity, equity and inclusion at the top echelons owing to a biased selection process led career stagnation of the officers. To begin from the top brass, experts highlight a major fissure in the selection of the COAS. Appointment of COAS saw a blatant compromise of merit for seniority and this deprived the forces of quality leadership (Suman, 2010) with instances wherein COAS were appointed on sheer political considerations and government interference (Singh, 2019). The same percolated to the levels of senior leadership. After the time-based promotions till the rank of a Lt Col, the Indian Army follows a pyramidical-selection system. Under this structure, a meagre 15 % of army officers made it to the rank of a Colonel, while his counterpart in the IAS or IPS was sure to attain a time bound promotion and reach the higher echelons. Moreover, only those officers who are deemed competent in terms of their combat experience were selected. Contrarily, the appraisal reports of the officers who were posted in peace stations were found to be extremely inflated.

The impact of this was seen in the results of most recent promotion boards where the bulk of officers with combat edge were superseded by their peers who have had plush peace postings. (Bakshi, 2010). The struggles continued as even after attaining the rank of a Colonel, it could take another ten years to attain the next rank i.e., of a Brigadier. Besides, the glacial pace of promotion, the discriminating promotional policy, the receding reputation of the Indian Army, increasing levels of corruption, and the poor pay scales, led to anguish and consternation in the minds of the officers and resulted in a massive talent drain. The officers forming up the junior leadership, and PBORs opting for pre-mature retirement led to a shortage of 30% officers. In a recent article by Business Today, the official figures reported that the Indian Armed Forces had a total of 78, 291 positions vacant. Apart from that, data tabled in the Parliament showed that during 2012-15, one officer from the Indian Armed Forces had quit every day and the number of vacancies were reported to be 11000. Indian Army currently has a shortage of 7399 officers against an authorized strength of 50,312 (Kumar, 2015).

The government agencies also reported sizeable decline in the number of applications for the Combined Defence Services examination since 2013. Besides, 40% of the applicants did not appear for the examination (Ohri, 2018). Resultantly, the forces decided to thin down the strength and instead of a sanctioned strength of 30, a regiment had to function with just 10 officers. This time starved and stressed the junior leadership to work on the officer-men camaraderie (Mohan, 2020). The Indian Army is losing its sheen and last 3 financial years witnessed it spend a humungous sum of Rs. 8 crores in media and advertising to create sustained image projections, which too failed to attract the right kind of talent. They next respite was a foray in the social media space with the Information Warfare Cell. The idea is perception management by dispelling negative and false news about the army. But again, the leadership failed to identify that a bad word of mouth is stronger than good PR and advertising.

Unfortunately, the force's slow pace to make needed improvements, behind times in knowledge and practice and resistance to change had caused it considerable damage. According to MoD (1965) report the first restructuring that the Indian Armed Forces ever debuted was after the defeat of 1962. The restructuring witnessed the force level of army rising from 5.5 lakh to 8.25 lakh. The same report confirms that the next round of restructuring took place in 1975, with the Krishna Rao Committee recommending a massive mechanization drive of the army, including the raising of Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division (RAPID), the aviation corps, introduction of Bofors guns and the up scaling of mechanized infantry as an independent corps, thereby strengthening the maneuver warfare concepts of the army.

The next a major military introspection was conducted after Kargil War (1999) which exposed the poor state of army equipment (Chadha, 2019). Major General Malik (2006) echoed the same sentiments when he wrote "In 1997–98, the Army budget was Rs 16,384 crore. After accounting for maintenance, works (i.e., construction of accommodation, storage and connected facilities) and contractual liabilities, only Rs 230 crore or 1.4 per cent was available for funding modernization schemes". The point to ponder here was that the armed forces has had just two major restructurings in last 52 years and that too as discrete events following wars and skirmishes.

The strategic security environment has changed with the need for high intensity fighting skills. Operation Parakram brought to the fore the importance of versatile, agile, flexible forces. Hybrid warfare, integrated tactics, increased fluidity, rapid deployability, sensor-to-shooter technologies, direct communication interface to lowest level commanders/individual soldiers and relatively faster decision-making place soldiers and commanders alike under tremendous pressure (Saini, 2008). A qualitative upgradation was a must in the training methodologies adopted for the officers and men across the ranks. The current system of training and assessing the competence of an officer was termed as primordial. The traditional military skills were to be supported with creatively modified academic and intellectual skills at all levels (Subramaniam, 2020).

Global Practices and Way Forward

Warrick's framework (2016) puts forth the characteristics of high and low performance cultures and unfortunately, the Indian Army, and the armed forces provides explicit evidence substantiating each characteristic of a stagnating culture. Is all lost or a lot is still recoverable is the idea with which the authors explored the literature and garnered evidence from world class armies across the globe. Based on a robust research, the authors propose following measures and recommendations to address the challenges faced by the armed forces.

Integration within the Tri-Services of the Armed Forces

An overarching entity like the CDS seemingly is the solution to bridge the gap. The integrated model has an unequivocal acceptance worldwide. Currently, 64 countries including China have the CDS. The US Armed Forces is an apt example of an integrated force. India too has decided to go for it. 'Integratedness' shall bring all the forces under one umbrella and rationalize the expenses on training, logistics and inventory, allow better manpower planning and above all make the armed forces a single cohesive and formidable entity.

Role Clarity-Security Vs. Defense

Germany has a very clear definition of roles of its security agencies. The clarity has been so stark that it finds an incorporation in the German constitution. While the police are entrusted with the job of internal security, the armed forces have an exclusive responsibility of dealing with external security threats. Countries like Chile, Argentina and Uruguay too oppose the use of soldiers within the country´s limits. India probably needs such a provision, as it shall go a long way in increasing the public trust and respect for police and spare the armed forces for a much more sacrosanct job, which it is essentially meant for.

The Stress in the Wake of a Connected World

Suicide is a poorly understood health problem in the Indian armed forces. A MoD report cited stress as the main reason and a number of steps were taken in the direction viz. better facilities for the men, psychological counsellors, Mansik Sahayta Helpline, liberal leave policy, grievance redressal and the like. However, these have not been able to address the concern as expected. India direly needs a centralized body for developing, implementing, integrating, and evaluate suicide prevention policies and procedures.

So, we need to draw and learn from the endeavors of other nations on suicide prevention. The US has a dedicated Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) set up in 2012 (Kamarack, 2019). Responsible for "advocacy, program oversight, and policy for Department of Defense (DOD) suicide prevention, intervention and postvention efforts to reduce suicidal behaviors" The office operates a 24/7 Military Crisis Line and produces quarterly reports on all its well-being interventions.

Preparation of an elaborate resource manual by the American Association of Suicidology and the U. S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine. Which lays down a clear suicide prevention strategy with a robust support system from within the army structure consisting of army leadership and a wide array of helping services and programs.

Ethical Transgression

In the Indian context, there are dedicated ethics training schools for military officers—such as the Indian Navy's Centre of Excellence in Ethics, Leadership and Behaviour Studies (CELABS), and the Indian Air Force's Air Force Centre of Ethics and Behavioral Sciences (AF-CLABS). Besides, special modules in ethics courses are commonplace and ensure a reinforcement of institutional ethos.

But the pedagogical pattern and syllabi of the dedicated ethics training school needs audit and consequent upgradation. Case study approach has confirmed to yield behavioral changes as substantiated by B-school trainers and thus this needs an inclusion in the military ethics courses. Civilian psychologists should be empaneled as faculty to write and impart the case studies ensuring a holistic and inclusive approach to delivery on ethics. Moreover, seamless connection with the external world over new age media platforms, may compel the men to make social comparisons and thus make them perceive the inequity and some may yet find their service life incompatible with their individual expectations. It's here that a rigorous training on services' different ethos and values shall make a difference and provide a moral compass.

It's noteworthy that US Department of Defence has a publication named 'Encyclopedia of Ethical Failures' (2014). The objective of the document is to sensitize and educate personnel. Senior leadership with a service tenure of 16 years and more should focus on moral mentoring the juniors. The ethics training methodology of Norwegian Defence forces is worth emulating. Norwegian Defence Forces Ethics Training Model at the Norwegian military academy is essentially about a three-pronged approach consisting of addressing moral dilemmas arising in the military context, followed by moral mentoring and moral reflection.

Bernsten and Rolfsen (2008) propose that during the training, the cadets are encouraged to apply various ethical theories to potential real-time challenges they may face on the ground, followed by robust, critical discussions. Most importantly, ragging and unauthorized punishments in academies are the setting stone overpowering situational factors. It is an early expression of power imbalance and makes the imbalance further pervasive and acceptable and thus needs an immediate curb.

Incorporating public opinion for the Armed Forces

Trust of the citizens in the armed forces is a must. A rampant problem in India, is where media both old and new age, can make and mar organizations. A survey should be conducted to measure the trust that the citizens pose in the armed forces. Many countries have administered surveys for measuring public trust for the armed forces (Caforio, 2008). Europe, China and USA could be cited as a case in point. The utility of these surveys lies in the fact that the findings can rescue the most revered institution from the onslaught of media. A 'security survey' is administered annually to find out the duties of the Swiss Armed Forces in view of the Swiss Population (Ferst & Tresch, 2007). Besides, media has had a profound role in the conduct of military operations worldwide and its intrusiveness is likely to increase. In times to come, the military shall be obliged to have its own facilities to feed the electronic media channels.

The Civil-Military Synergy

Morris Janowitz (1959), the ideation of an American military sociologist, resulted in a "convergence between military culture and civil society; in other words, the civilianization of the military and the militarization of civil society". While the men in uniform are trained for a combat, the civil servants are trained to deal with the "threat of the use of legitimate force", as also clinching arms-related deals and treaties (Gautam, 2019). Therefore, a civil-military synergy is thus inevitable. Thanks to the efforts of the CDS, the Indian Defence University (IDU), is likely to be in existence soon. The university will see a mix of military officers and civil servants who have knowledge of their craft along with experience, and civilian academics to teach and mentor research.

Besides the proposed IDU, select universities in India can have military related subjects like military psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, international peace, law and the likes. The Department of War Studies and School of Security Studies in United Kingdom's King College London are thus organized (Gautam, 2011). Practices from the Brazilian Military Institutions if imbibed can hold us in good stead. They offer postgraduate programs where both the officers and civilians co-exist. The idea is to prepare the officers for getting commissioned in the army, while the civilians exit for jobs in the security sector (Bruneau & Tollefson, 2014).

Tour of Duty/Citizen Army

India is envisaging upon a Citizen Army also known as a 'Tour of Duty'. Entailing to induct the college going youth in the army, akin to a three-year internship. Attracting the segment which is fascinated by the army life but not inclined to join it as a long-term career option. The arrangement shall surely be a win-win as the armed forces will be able to draw upon a pool of energetic and verdant youth. Similarly, the youth will get to live a life of adventure along with imbibing the values and ethos of the army, making them a better fit when they return to their mainstream jobs.

The officials confirm that even from an economic stance the tour of duty shall be prove beneficial. The training, allowances and pay costs would reduce to a meagre Rs. 80-85 lakhs as compared to a whopping Rs. 6 crores for an officer under the SSC, who serves typically for only 14 years and then struggles to find jobs in the private sector. Along with consequential savings on salary and pension budgets, which can always be employed on modernizing the army.

The tour of duty has been empirically investigated by the Israel armed forces. They successfully experimented with the tour of duty model where families and schools were found to have a profound influence on adolescent's choice of rendering a tour of duty. We should draw a leaf if ever the proposal translates into a reality.

Overcoming Resistance to Change

The authors draw attention to the fact that the Indian military is largely unequipped and untrained on using the hybrid technologies as well as facing the same if in case a combat needs such a coping. The operational environment of the armed forces has changed with a stark reconfiguration of the battle frontiers. Major armies across the globe are downsizing and simultaneously investing more resources than ever in technology. Modernization versus expansion of forces is a difficult and unnecessary trade off. Mobile, agile, and hi-tech is the new hygiene factor, beyond human valor. The domain is far beyond a physical skirmish and has entered the realms of psychological, cognitive and emotional domains.

The change necessitates a corresponding change in the development of new military technologies to complement and support human capabilities in all operational endeavors. The new technologies include the networked (hybrid) weapon systems like cyberwar, bioweapons, robotics, nano technology. Western nations have expanded the religious influence in their organization by employing religious authorities for policy making within the military. This has led to the inculcation of religious values, added to the diversity, and helped address the ethical dilemmas and inspire the men for making sacrifices for the nation.

Revamping Military Training

A revamp of the warfare necessitates a corresponding revamp in the training requirements. Junior commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers have pivotal roles to exercise as these they hold the key to modern warfare of the 21st Century. They thus require robust training in leadership skills and precise training to make them agile and fluid. The military training academies taking in the young talent should focus on developing the faculties of the young cadets by imparting them knowledge in the areas of theory of war, military history, military psychology, aeronautical/naval science, space science, weapon technology, nuclear physics, management (Panag, 2019). At the middle and senior leadership level they need to cater to the integratedness of the forces, the joint phase of the Defence Services Staff Course should be increased. Thus, may require a compressing of the single service segment. Creation of a Joint Operations Wing to provide for training requirements for commanders of joint operations. The wing could be located at any of the institutions conducting the Higher Command Course for single services like the Army War College, Naval War College or the College of Air Warfare, depending upon the feasibility of developing the infrastructure.

CONCLUSION

In the end the authors assert that modernization and synergy can help the Indian Armed Forces rejuvenate from a state of stagnation to a state of its quintessentially glorious culture. But they also raise the following pertinent questions: Based on the study the Indian Army in particular and the Indian Armed Forces in general should ponder upon the poor state of affairs of the forces in the last decade? Can they themselves swear by their own culture and ethos? Does this honor code, or core set of values, credos of the various arms still guiding the men of the forces? Or have they become just a set of guidelines which look good only in the hall of fame of their alma mater. The Indian Armed Forces are still the source of pride for the citizens of the Republic of India and nothing can change that.

A quote from the Time Magazine released after the India-China 1962 war debacle summed up the spirit of the Indian defence forces and the Indian Army quite brilliantly and it said, 'The Indian Army needs almost everything except courage'. Nothing can devalue the sacrifices of the brave hearts of our country. But, more than the general public, or media houses, are not the men in uniform themselves belittling the achievements of their organization and their own brethren? Is a career in the defence forces still promising one of the most prestigious and respected positions in the country? Are youngsters still aspiring to choose a career of excitement, adventure, challenges and can find no better place than defence to meet all their professional expectations?" (National Portal of India).

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